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An Overview of Micro- and Macroprudential 
Policy Tools in the EU in the Times of the 
COVID-19 Pandemic Economic Shock
Abstract
The fi nancial crisis from 2008 and the following Eurozone crisis from 
2012 created an incentive to establish a system of fi nancial supervision 
at the European Union (“EU”) level, due to the fact that the policy tool 
commonly used turned out to be ineffective. With regards to banking 
supervision, the package of legislations: “CRR/CRD” and “BRRD” has 
been adopted as a response to fi nancial system shortcomings, in order to 
make it more resilient and harmonised. One of the challenges was to take 
control of the so-called: “too big to fail” fi nancial institutions, therefore 
next to macroprudential supervision, microprudential policy pools were 
introduced. This constituted the phenomena of the shift from regulation-
based supervision to risk-based supervision with the aim of reducing the 
systemic risk in each and every EU Member State and, in turn, prevent 
possible future crises. In this paper, those methods will be gathered, 
presented, and discussed in the light of the current COVID-19 pandemic 
crisis. 
Keywords: European Union, Banking Union, Microprudential, Macro-
prudential, COVID-19, Crisis
Introduction
In the theory of macroeconomics it is assumed that, as the economy 
has been fl uctuating, either due to the demand or supply shocks, the usual 
response of the states and governors was to use monetary and fi scal policy 
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tools. The aim was to deal with the impact of those shocks in order to 
diminish potentially severe consequences and ease a smooth comeback 
to market equilibrium.1 During the latest global fi nancial crisis, which 
started at the end of 2007, we discovered that the monetary policy might 
not be effective if the fi nancial system is impaired. This crisis is said to be 
the deepest and most severe economic downturn since the infamous Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Although the crisis began in the United States, 
it spread around the world quickly and soon became a global issue. It 
occurred because all markets are now highly interrelated in such a hectic 
and deeply globalised economy. In other words, the global economy is 
highly internationalised, which implies that not only well-developed, but 
also developing countries were affected by the crisis and therefore suffered. 
After the crisis spread to Europe, it hit the economies of EU countries. 
In response, the European Central Bank (“ECB”), an EU institution 
responsible for the monetary policy of those EU Member States which 
have adopted the euro, implemented a very ambitious monetary policy, 
intervening heavily in the Eurozone’s economies. The expansionary 
monetary policy stance may not be, however, expected to last forever.2 
This policy has generated substantial risks to both the ECB’s primary 
task and its independence. Consequently, it appeared not to be enough 
given that a policy trade-off between stabilising inflation and output gap 
emerged.3 It seems that the monetary policy would not be effective if the 
fi nancial system is impaired, which led to the need for a fundamental 
evaluation of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy.4
Macro- and Microprudential Policy in the EU
The global fi nancial crisis highlighted the need for a macroprudential 
policy framework. In 2009 the European Commission, which is the 
EU’s politically independent executive body, commissioned a high-level 
group chaired by Jacques de Larosière (ex-director of the International 
Monetary Fund). The group’s task was to prepare a proposal to strengthen 
fi nancial supervision with the aim of better protecting citizens and 
restoring their trust in the fi nancial system. It has to be emphasised 
1  A. Benassy-Quere, et al., Economic Policy Theory and Practice, second edition, 
Oxford 2019, p. 227.
2  The European Economic Advisory Group, Report on the European Economy, In-
stitute for Economic Research, 2010, p. 28. 
3  A. Silvo, The Interaction of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies, “Journal of 
Money. Credit and Banking”, no. 51(4)/2019, DOI: https://10.1111/jmcb.12524.
4  S. Eijffi nger, L. Hoogduin, ECB: Quo Vadis?, “Intereconomics”, no. 53(3)/2018, 
pp. 170–173, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-018-0741-8.
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that the aim of macroprudential regulation shall not be considered as 
to eliminate recessions.5 Research shows that macroprudential policies 
are able to alleviate the impact of capital ratio on lending, in particular 
during a crisis, and may have certain implications for policymakers in 
the area of implementation of commonly recognised standards targeted at 
the reduction of borrower risk-taking.6 In the EU, a number of important 
steps have been taken to address this issue. The major takeaway was that 
supervision should be exercised on macro (overall systemic risk) and 
microprudential (limit the distress at individual institutions) levels.7 
Macroprudential policy seeks to increase the resilience of fi nancial 
system to shocks, limit the build-up of vulnerabilities over time, control 
the structural vulnerabilities that could rise from inter-linkages and 
control the “too big to fail” institutions.8 Such a framework would 
equip the authorities responsible for overseeing the fi nancial system 
with appropriate mandates, analytical tools, and instruments to address 
systemic risk. The intermediate targets of macroprudential policy can 
be related to externalities that arise along dimensions of systemic risk,9 
however, it has to the emphasised that this idea is not particularly new. 
When the German economy suffered during Great Depression and had to 
fi ght severe infl ation and depression, there was a dedicated organisation 
established, namely the Bank for International Settlements whose aim 
was to deal with systemic risk. On the EU level, the defi nition might be 
derived from Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010.10 According to the mentioned 
Regulation, “systemic risk” connotes a risk of disruption in the fi nancial 
system with the potential to have serious negative consequences for the 
real economy of the EU as a whole, or of one or more of its Member States 
5  D. Aikman, J. Bridges, A. Kashyap, C. Siegert, Would Macroprudential Regulation 
Have Prevented the Last Crisis?, “Journal of Economic Perspectives”, no. 33(1)/2019, 
pp. 107–113, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.33.1.107.
6  M. Olszak, S. Roszkowska, I. Kowalska, Do macroprudential policy instruments re-
duce the procyclical impact of capital ratio on bank lending? Cross-country evidence, “Baltic 
Journal of Economics”, no. 19(1)/2019, pp. 1–38, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14060
99X.2018.1547565.
7  A. Alin-Marius, F. Melnic, S. Nistor, Effects of Macroprudential Policy on Sys-
temic Risk and Bank Risk Taking, “Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and 
Finance”, no. 68(3)/2018. 
8  Ibidem.
9  G. Galati, R. Moessner, What Do We Know About the Effects of Macropruden-
tial Policy?, “Economica”, no. 85(340)/2018, pp. 735–770, DOI: http://10.1111/ec-
ca.12229.
10  Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the fi nancial 
system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, Brussels 30/12/2019. 
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and for the functioning of the internal market. The quoted defi nition 
shall address any risk of disruption in fi nancial services which would 
be caused by an impairment of all or parts of the fi nancial system and 
would have the potential to have serious negative consequences for the 
internal market and the real economy. It is worth mentioning that all 
types of fi nancial intermediaries, markets, and infrastructure may be 
potentially systemically important to a degree (even those falling under 
the defi nition of shadow banking). Systemic risk shall be also understood 
as the risk that some market participants could be unable to meet their 
obligations due to the insolvency of the another market participant.11 As 
a result of a chain reaction, considerable solvency problems can arise for 
all of the interlinked market participants. It could threaten the stability of 
the entire fi nancial system. The aim of macroprudential supervision is to 
identify, evaluate, and mitigate risk to the fi nancial system and is how it 
serves its purpose. Macroprudential monitoring also refers to the activities 
of the relevant supervisory authorities at national and supranational 
levels in case a crisis were to be inevitable so that the fi nancial system 
would not create shocks which could trigger recessions or amplify other 
shocks to make recessions materially worse.12 As per its defi nition, 
macroprudential supervision seeks to ensure fi nancial stability; however, 
some researchers are of the opinion that there is no clear defi nition of 
fi nancial stability.13 In other words, the objective of macroprudential 
policy is to use prudential means to enhance system-wide fi nancial 
stability with a view to limiting macroeconomic costs from fi nancial 
distress.14 For this reason, macroprudential monitoring supplements the 
microprudential supervision of the individual institutions that serve as 
economic actors in the fi nancial system i.e., credit institutions, insurers, 
asset managers, shadow banks, fi nancial market infrastructures and other 
fi nancial institutions and markets. Dedicated supervisiory authorities 
have been established on the national and supranational level to safeguard 
the mandate in that regard. This mandate has the above-mentioned ECB 
for the Eurozone countries, whereas for instance in Poland, the statutory 
objective of the Polish Central Bank [pl: Narodowy Bank Polski (“NBP”)] 
11  F. Strauss, Soft Law als Steuerungsinstrument in der Bankenausicht, Eine Unter-
suchung im Völkerrecht, europäischen Unionsrecht und deutschen Verfassungsrecht am 
Beispiel der Basler Akkorde, Nomos, Baden-Baden 2016, p. 36, DOI: https://doi.
org/10.5771/9783845271712.
12  D.D. Aikman, J. Bridges, A. Kashyap, C. Siegert, op.cit., pp. 107–113.
13  R.A. Moruţan, A view of macroeconomic stability, “Annals of Faculty of Eco-
nomics”, no. 1(2)/2015, pp. 720–727, https://repec:ora:journl:v:1:y:2015:i:2: (access 
1.04.2021).
14  G. Galati, R. Moessner, op.cit., pp. 735–770.
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is to reduce or eliminate systemic risk and the macroprudential objective 
of the NBP is to ensure the resilience of the fi nancial system if the systemic 
risk materialises.15
Among the macroprudential policy tools introduced in the EU, 
a number of measures shall be distinguished.16 A set of relevant capital 
buffers plays a major role. Under the defi nition of a buffer, it may be 
considered an additional layer of usable capital that can be drawn down 
when losses are incurred by an entity. Depending on the aim of the 
particular buffer, it may be distinguished as: 
– Combined capital buffer requirement (CCoB) – required for a credit 
institution to meet its own funds requirement; 
– Countercyclical capital buffer requirement (CCyB) – designed 
to mitigate pro-cyclicality in the fi nancial system and to build 
a capital buffer during periods of excessive credit growth, which is 
then released when a systemic risk abates; 
– Structural systemic risks (SRB) – designated as a long-term non-
cyclical nature and shall be imposed on the basis of the fi nancial 
system’s structural risks and any potential vulnerabilities affecting 
the fi nancial system; 
The required percentage of capital that needs to be held differs among 
buffers. Recent developments lead to common practice of imposing the 
buffers depending on the size of the institution. There is distinction 
between Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (“G-SII”)17 
and Systemically Important Financial Institutions (“O-SII”). In other 
words, those which, from an international perspective, are considered 
“too big to fail” (G-SII) and i.e., those which, from a domestic perspective, 
are considered “too big to fail” (O-SII), whereas the assessment shall be 
conducted on the national level by a competent supervisiory authority. 
In Member States with a less signifi cant banking market such as Poland, 
there is no G-SII at all. 
The next category of macroprudential measures consists of the 
recognition measures in the area of liquidity, as well as indicators from 
the balance sheet analysis, such as: risk weights (RW), loss given default 
15  Narodowy Bank Polski, Wskaźniki cyklu kredytowego oraź kalibracja anty-
cyklicznego bufora kapitałowego w Polsce, 2016, https://www.nbp.pl/nadzorma-
kroostroznosciowy/publikacje/2016.02.15_poziom_ccb.pdf (access 20.12.2020).
16  U. Kochanska, The ESRB Macroprudential Measures Database, December 2017, 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/national_policy/shared/pdf/esrb_macroprudentialmeasu
resdatabase_20171215_en.pdf (access 20.12.2020).
17  Financial Stability Board, Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
(G-SIFIs), https://www.fsb.org/work-of-the-fsb/policy-development/addressing-sifi s/
global-systemically-important-fi nancial-institutions-g-sifi s/ (access 20.04.2020).
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(LGD) fl oors, and limits for: loan-to-value (LTV),18 loan-to-income 
(LTI) or debt servicing to-income (DSTI), liquidity charges, loan-to-
deposit (LTD) limit, and liquidity buffers. Those measures are imposed 
by the supervision authority and any deviation by a particular institution 
constitutes a red fl ag.
This introduction of the above-mentioned macroprudential policy 
tools has generated substantial risks to both the ECB’s primary task and 
its independence.19 Unfortunately, despite those measures, a so-called 
“sovereign debt crisis” emerged in Greece, Portugal, and Ireland in 
year 201220 and had negative implications for the Eurozone as a whole. 
It became apparent that due to the close links between public budgets 
and the banking sector, a crisis in one Member State could easily lead to 
cross-border contagion and fi nancial dislocation in other EU countries. It 
strengthened the need to establish a system of fi nancial supervision at the 
EU level, an incentive to which had already been indicated during the fi rst 
wave of consequences of the fi nancial crisis from 2008. At that time, the 
European Commission presented an action plan for the banking union. 
Such a regulatory project for banking supervision was implemented in 
accordance with a so-called: Lamfl aussy process. The legislation was passed 
to ensure the security of the European banking system by establishing 
a European System of Financial Supervision as of 1st of January 2011, 
consisting of three supervisory authorities representing each sector of 
the fi nancial market: banking, capital, and insurance.21 Subsequently, 
as a response to the above-mentioned “European sovereign debt crisis”, 
the common system of fi nancial supervision, comprising the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (“SSM”), the ECB and the national competent 
authorities of the Eurozone countries has been established. The SSM aims 
to ensure the security and solidity of the European banking system and 
to increase fi nancial integration and stability in Europe. The SSM plays 
a vital role in the new banking supervision system for Europe. The EU’s 
Banking Union, however, still unfi nished, enables the uniform application 
of EU banking rules in the Member States. The major legislations, of 
which the Banking Union consists, may be stated as follows: Regulation 
18  R. Bachmann, S.K. Ruth, Systematic Monetary Policy and the Macroeconomic 
Effects of shifts in residential Loan-To-Value ratios, “International Economic Review”, 
no. 61(2)/2020, DOI: https://10.1111/iere.12432. 
19  S. Eijffi nger, L. Hoogduin, op.cit., pp. 170–173.
20  I. Jianu, A comprehensive view on the manifestations of aggregate demand and ag-
gregate supply shocks in Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal, “Theoretical and Applied 
Economics”, no. 2(607)/2016, pp. 207–224.
21  M. Iwanicz-Drozdowska, Europejska sieć bezpieczeństwa fi nansowego. Rozwiązania 
pokryzysowe, “Studia BAS”, no. 1(53)/2018, pp. 7–24.
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(EU) No 575/2013 (“CRR”),22 Directive 2013/36/EU (“CRD”),23 and 
Directive 2014/59/EU (“BRRD”).24
Post-crisis reforms in the EU have two major objectives, the main one 
is to reduce the probability of future crises and another is to improve the 
crisis resolution mechanism in case of a crisis.25 Some scholars suggest 
that after the implementation of reforms, the greatest challenge for the 
ECB has been to lift the infl ation rate just below 2%.26
The above-described evolution of the supervisory approach constitutes 
a shift from regulation based to risk-based supervision27. At the beginning, 
a purely regulation or compliance-based supervision approach was 
preferred. The compliance-based approach aims at allocating regulatory 
resources equally across all regulated entities in a particular Member-State. 
In other words, there is no distinction of risk distribution regardless of 
the size of the entities. As a consequence, the “too big to fail” institutions 
are treated as equally as all the others, including small cooperative 
banks. With the development of the supervisory approach, risk-based 
supervision was considered more effective. Risk-based supervision 
requires regulators, both on national and supranational levels, to assess 
the risk of individual entities falling under the scope of supervision in 
order to effi ciently reduce the systemic risk to the wider economy. Setting 
an add-on is usually performed by supervisory judgement on a case-by-
22  Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment fi rms 
and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (Text with EEA relevance)Text with 
EEA relevance, Brussels 27.06.2020.
23  Dyrektywa Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady 2013/36/UE z dnia 26 czerwca 
2013 r. w sprawie warunków dopuszczenia instytucji kredytowych do działalności 
oraz nadzoru ostrożnościowego nad instytucjami kredytowymi i fi rmami inwestycyj-
nymi, zmieniająca dyrektywę 2002/87/WE i uchylająca dyrektywy 2006/48/WE oraz 
2006/49/WE. Tekst mający znaczenie dla EOG, Brussels 29/12/2020. 
24  Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions 
and investment fi rms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 
2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/
EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, Text with EEA relevance, Brussels 
07.01.2020. 
25  C.M. Bunch, B. Weigert, Macroprudential policy in a currency union, “Review of 
World Economics”, 155(1)/2019, pp. 23–33, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-018
-0332-6.
26  B.S. Pîra, Eurozone And The Low Infl ation Risk, Sea - Practical Application Of Sci-
ence, “Romanian Foundation For Business Intelligence”, no. 8/2015, pp. 149–153.
27  T. Randle, Risk Based Supervision, World Bank, 2009, DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1596/27499.
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case basis. Some researchers confi rm that in pre-crisis times we had to deal 
with internal synchronisation between the fi nancial and economic crisis, 
while the post-crisis times are characterised by external international 
synchronisation, which may directly translate into the ease of use of 
macroeconomic tools.28
As the process of completing the Banking Union is still unfi nished 
and is constantly developing, and in response to fi nancial system 
shortcomings observed, the European Commission, after getting the 
opinion of the ECB, proposed in 2019 amendments to the CRR/CRD and 
BRRD, with the aim of boosting resilience and stability. Among others 
introduced, one may indicate the following requirements imposed on 
credit institutions: 
– Leverage ratio (“LCR”), which allows for the assessment of 
institutions’ exposure to the risk of excessive leverage (going 
concern approach); 
– Total loss absorption capacity (“TLAC”) – a new requirement, 
designed for global, systemically important banks to ensure that 
they would have enough equity and bail-in debt to pass losses to 
investors and minimise the risk of a government bailout (the gone 
concern approach); 
– Increased requirement on minimum own funds and eligible 
liabilities requirement (“MREL”) imposed in order to avoid 
institutions structuring their liabilities in a way that impedes the 
effectiveness of the bail in or other resolution tools, and to avoid the 
risk of contagion or a bank run (gone concern approach);29 
– Altered Pillar 2 Requirement (“P2R”) that is a legally binding 
capital requirement, which applies in addition to minimum capital 
requirement (Pillar 1) and covers risks which are underestimated or 
not covered by this requirement (going concern approach); 
– Pillar 2 Guidance (“P2G”), which shall be understood similarly to 
P2R, however, it is not legally binding (going concern approach); 
and 
– Net stable funding ratio (“NSFR”) – a new ratio of a long-term 
liquidity (going concern approach). 
28  Ł. Kurowski, K. Rogowicz, Are business and credit cycles synchronised internally 
or externally?, “Economic Modelling”, no. 74/2018, pp. 124–114, DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.econmod.2018.05.009.
29  European Banking Authority (EBA), FINAL Draft Regulatory Technical Stan-
dards on criteria for determining the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabili-
ties under Directive 2014/59/EU, EBA/RTS/2015/05, 2015.
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Some researchers are of the opinion that the recent fi nancial 
crisis highlighted that any policies, already implemented in the 
fi eld of macroeconomic stability prior to the year 2008, were not 
enough to foresee the upcoming crisis and prevent its consequences. 
Therefore, those researchers emphasise the need for a re-assessment of 
macroeconomic policies in order to fi nd adequate measures which can 
be taken during economic growth and could, in turn, limit the effects 
of upcoming future crises and to ensure adequate reserves for a possible 
default scenario30. Nevertheless, research shows that actions taken on 
the macroprudential level could have signifi cantly ameliorated the 
macroeconomic fall-out.31
COVID-19 – 2020 Shock
The above-described set up did not have to wait long for a trial in 
a real-life crisis scenario. While some researchers had already confi rmed 
the positive impact of macro-prudential tools,32 the World Health 
Organization (WHO) announced on 10th of March 2020 the outbreak 
of COVID-19 as a global pandemic. The mysterious and potentially 
extremely contagious virus, which started in China, had quickly spread 
to Italy and other EU countries. In order to maximise the probability of 
containment, governors of EU Member States decided to impose strict 
containment measures such as quarantines and “lockdowns”. On the top 
of that, it was accompanied by great degrees of uncertainty and implied 
a signifi cant negative shock to the aggregate demand and supply market 
of each of the EU Member States, and consequently potentially turning 
into a severe crisis in the long term. Both the demand and the supply side 
of the Member States’ economies’ have been affected. The supply side had 
signifi cant, negative implications for demand, especially affecting certain 
sectors disproportionately such as: tourism, transport, and recreational 
and cultural services. On the other hand, a drop in oil prices had also an 
impact on the effects of the current crisis.33
The initial projections for the implications of the COVID-19 shock on 
the economy such as a decline of GDP and the decline of HICP infl ation 
could be signifi cantly mitigated by immediate monetary policy reactions 
of each Member State. At glance, the level of panic highlighted that even 
30  R.A. Moruţan, op.cit., pp. 720–727.
31  D. Aikman, J. Bridges, A. Kashyap, C. Siegert, op.cit., pp. 107–113.
32  A. Alin-Marius, F. Melnic, S. Nistor, op.cit.
33  European Central Bank (ECB), ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro 
area, March 2020.
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though EU Member States started implementing similar measures, in 
order to prevent the spread of the virus and the threat of unknown, the 
governors were focusing on the national economies rather than realising 
the common goal on the supranational EU level and making decisions 
with implications on the common market. Monetary policy is usually 
assigned to central banks which are the independent entities free from 
any possible political infl uence. The decisions of central banks regarding 
the interest rates are affecting the money supply, GDP equation and, in 
turn, the aggregate supply, which allows the economy to easily come back 
to medium run equilibrium. Poland’s NBP used quantitative easing, 
deciding on purchasing longer-term securities from the open market in 
order to increase the money supply and encourage lending and investment 
increasing the money supply on the money market by the operations of 
the open market. On the other hand, there was the decision to cut the 
interest rate three times going to a historically low level from 1.5% to 0.1% 
and therefore the idea of zero interest rate or even negative interest rate 
in terms of the real terms has become vivid.34 It was a common occurance 
in well-developed economies of western EU Member States. As fi gures 
indicate, the difference in the reference interest rates between those set 
by the ECB and NBP has been diminishing over time.35
The credit institutions were signifi cantly affected by the interest 
rate decisions. Forecasts were far from optimistic and were foreseeing 
possibly extraordinary declines in profi t. In that regard, some 
researchers are examining whether the theory of Lucas – that the people 
make decisions based on experience from the past36 – applies to credit 
institutions.37 On the EU level, the institutions comprising the ESFS 
issued a number of statements or actions to deal with the effects of the 
COVID-19 crisis and mitigate its impact on the EU banking sector. 
It has been observed by the EU institutions that implications of the 
global crisis, which are said to be unprecedented, have prompted taking 
swift and decisive actions aimed at ensuring that credit institutions can 
continue to fulfi l their basic role in funding the real economy and are 
able to support economic recovery. Therefore, on the microprudential 
34  F. Kwalik, Raport o stanie biznesu w czasie kryzysu epidemiologicznego: Banki pod 
presją ryzyka kredytowego i NBP, „Forbes”, https://www.forbes.pl/gospodarka/banki-i-
system-fi nansowy-w-czasie-koronawirusa-raport/yx4fmlr (access 20.04.2020).
35  Z. Polanski, Stabilization Policies and Structural Developments: Poland and the 
Crises of 1929 and 2008, “CASE Working Papers”, no. 9(133)/2016.
36  A. Benassy-Quere, B. Ceure, P. Jacquet, J. Pisani-Ferry, op.cit.
37  C. Bohanon, N. Curott, The coronavirus market turmoil shows limits of monetary 
policy, “Indianapolis Business Journal”, 13.03.2020.
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level, the so-called CRR “quick fi x”38 was published in the EU Offi cial 
Journal on 26th of June 2020, as a part of a series of measures taken 
by European institutions to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on institutions across the Member States. The CRR “quick 
fix” introduced certain adjustments to the CRR, such as that which 
concerned supervisory reporting. The aim was to facilitate lending 
through a set of easing measures i.e., the preferable treatment of non-
performing portfolios by the credit institutions.39 This constitutes the 
evidence that the macroprudential tools with the aim to prevent from 
systemic risk were not enough in case of such an unexpected event. 
The CRR “quick fix” was accompanied by guidelines on legislative 
and non-legislative moratoria on loan repayments applied in the light 
of the COVID-19 crisis, which have been published by the EBA to 
enable banks to report the possible impact of the crisis on exposures 
under the definition of forbearance or as defaulted under distressed 
restructuring.40 This is especially due to the fact that even the most 
adverse stress scenarios introduced both by banks and supervisors 
were not able to forecast such an event.41 The aim of the guidelines 
was to address data needs and to coordinate short-term additional 
supervisory reporting and disclosure necessary for monitoring 
the implementation of the measures introduced in response to the 
COVID-19 crisis across the EU Member States. Recently introduced 
recognition measures played a role in the functioning of the credit 
institutions. The increased requirement on minimum own funds 
and eligible liabilities requirement (MREL) had an impact on the 
resolution planning in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
amendments to new requirement on total loss absorption capacity 
(TLAC) are also worth mentioning. 
38  Regulation (EU) 2020/873 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 June 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 575/2013 and (EU) 2019/876 as regards 
certain adjustments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Brussels, 24 June 2020.
39  Parlament Europejski, EU/EA measures to mitigate the economic, fi nancial 
and social effects of coronavirus State-of-play, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/think-
tank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_IDA(2020)645723 (access 4.06.2020).
40  European Banking Authority (EBA), Guidelines on legislative and non-legisla-
tive moratoria on loan repayments applied in the light of the COVID-19 crisis, https://
eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/credit-risk/guidelines-legislative-and-non-legis-
lative-moratoria-loan-repayments-applied-light-covid-19-crisis (access 22.04.2021).
41  European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), Macro-fi nancial scenario for the 2020 
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In order to boost capitalisation, credit institutions started searching 
for alternative solutions. Therefore, the growing popularity of hybrid 
fi nancial instruments might be observed. Within the meaning of hybrid 
fi nancial instruments, the instruments combining the features of debt 
and capital, with characteristics of optionality shall be understood. Those 
instruments have been granted based on the CRR and are known as 
Additional Tier 1 hybrid fi nancial instruments (AT1).42 One can model 
them without any restrictions and is free to add debt or capital attributes, 
however, complexity and the existence of sources of risk in the forms 
of market risk, default risk, different levels of equity and interest rate 
convexity, etc. resulted in shortcomings of existing pricing models and as 
a consequence left those AT1 instruments under-priced;43 what for some 
looks like an equity instrument with bond-like risk could turn out to 
deliver a bond-like return with equity volatility. This is especially the case 
in times of the COVID-19 global pandemic, wherein the market conditions 
have shifted to the most severe stress scenarios. It could be argued that 
even the most adverse scenarios created by the banks failed to predict the 
rapid and unexpected consequences of the economic crisis arose as a post 
COVID-19 heavy-measure effect. The extraordinary levels of volatility 
recorded in fi nancial markets since the outbreak of COVID-19 initially 
had a signifi cant impact on the capital requirements for market risk for 
institutions given that the Value at Risk fi gures increased as a consequence 
of the observed higher volatility, and also because of the increase of the 
quantitative market risk multipliers. This impacts the Common Equity 
Tier 1 (“CET1”) ratios and the capacity of the institution to continue 
market making activities and provide market liquidity, which in turn 
may adversely affect the market order.44 Moreover, an excessive increase 
of capital requirements for market risk would impede the objective to 
free up capital to support lending to the real economy. From a fi nancial-
engineering point of view, those instruments may be considered as perfect 
tool for maximising profi t, given that the typical convertible arbitrage 
strategy employs delta-neutral hedging, whereas a large positive gamma 
can make the portfolio highly profi table, especially in case of large 
42  M. Liberadzki, K. Liberadzki, Konstrukcja Zasady Emisji i Wycena Hybrydowych 
Papierów Wartościowych na Eurorynku, Warszawa 2016. 
43  A. Macrina, O. Mahomed, Consistent Valuation Across Curves Using Pricing Ker-
nels, 2018, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3102513. 
44  Europejski Bank Centralny, Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 May 
2020 on amendments to the Union prudential framework in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic (CON/2020/16) 2020/C 180/04, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/
TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020AB0016&from=EN (access 22.04.2021).
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movements in the underlying stock price.45 The excessive increase in 
capital requirements for market risk would hamper the goal of freeing 
up capital to support lending and could lead to a “credit crunch”.46 The 
European Parliament decided not to adopt general measures to impose 
mandatory AT1 coupon restrictions for institutions that benefi t from 
relief and capital conservation measures and not to give new powers to 
regulators to apply temporary suspensions of distributions to holders of 
AT1 coupons.47 Nevertheless, this has not been unifi ed among the EU 
Member States.
Regarding the open market operations on the EU level, the idea of the 
so-called “Coronabond” was fl oated while discussing the possible solutions 
to deal with the effects of the crisis.48 The main aim of this idea is to rescue 
the worst-impacted countries such as Italy or Spain, where the economies 
are mostly based on tourism as one of the economy sectors severely hit. 
The idea per se is not a new one. The idea was previously raised by the 
European Commission as a proposed response to the European sovereign 
debt crisis as a possible solution. The idea, however, did not meet with the 
enthusiasm of Northern EU countries, such as Germany.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to gather, describe, present, and discuss 
the development of the supervision policy tools with regard to the 
macroprudential policy tools in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic 
shock. The full impact of the COVID-19 shock is very diffi cult to assess as 
the consequences are yet to come; the current epidemiological situation 
is far from stable. Financing conditions are expected to remain highly 
accommodative and the ECB’s monetary policy measures will continue to 
be transmitted to the economy.49 
45  C.W. Chang, J.S.K. Chang, Y. Feng, Pricing Options with Physically Based Exer-
cise and Random Maturity; “Journal of Insurance Issues”, no. 43(1)/2020, pp. 59–78.
46  R.A. Werner, Toward a new research programme on banking and the economy – Im-
plications of the Quantitative Theory of Credit for the prevention and resolution of banking 




48  N. Yoshino, H. Miyamoto, M.Z. Mumtaz, How Monetary & Fiscal Policy Can 
Work Against Coronavirus Shock: Proposal for the Issue of Corona Bonds, Japan SPOT-
LIGHT, May/June 2020.
49  European Central Bank (ECB): ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the 
euro area, March 2020.
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The fl oor has been open for discussion as to whether the lessons from 
2008’s crisis have been learned and the test has been passed or whether 
there is still room for improvement. Even in the worst-case scenarios, 
nobody expected that the announcement of the COVID-19 global 
pandemic and the resultant lockdown would became a huge “real life 
test” for all those methods. Risk-based supervision has been challenged 
resulting in insuffi cient adverse scenarios. Undoubtedly, it may be observed 
that, contrary to the previous global crisis, the response methods of the 
prudential policy mechanisms were introduced on the supranational level 
by the relevant EU institutions. With regards to the banking supervision, 
a so-called “quick fi x” has been adopted to the legislation as an immediate 
response with the aim of making the fi nancial system more resilient and 
stable. As a consequence of introduced moratoria, credit institutions 
were enabled to collect information on the real effects of their fi nancial 
condition. In addition, it allowed for reporting on the possible impact of 
a crisis on exposures under the existing defi nition of default or default 
under emergency restructuring (as defi ned in Article 178 (3) (d) of the 
CRR). The phenomenon of a credit crunch has not been observed yet, 
however, the lowering the interest rates would have implications in the 
long term.
Taking the abovementioned into account is important in order to allow 
effective monitoring of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
application of response measures. This is especially the case, taking into 
account that the majority of the possible outcomes is just a forecast, whereas 
the development of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis is too unpredictable to 
allow for a decent and reliable conclusion. Therefore, this topic deserves 
to be further examined in the upcoming future.
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